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encompasses and sustains history also became a uniquely single point 
in history as one man, savior of the world. 
Let me begin by quoting from the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, a passage that I think can explain why we are here for these conversations:
Catholics must joyfully acknowledge and esteem the truly 
Christian endowments from our common heritage which 
are to be found among our separated brethren. It is right 
and salutary to recognize the riches of Christ and virtu-
ous works in the lives of others who are bearing witness to 
Christ, sometimes even to the shedding of their blood. . . . 
Nor should we forget that whatever is wrought by the grace 
of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of our separated brethren 
can contribute to our own edification. Whatever is truly 
Christian never conflicts with the genuine interests of the 
faith; indeed, it can always result in the more ample realiza-
tion of the very mystery of Christ and the Church.2 
Of course, when this teaching was promulgated in 1965, nearly 
all Christian churches affirmed the centrality of Christ. Indeed, the 
World Council of Churches made it a condition of membership 
that the applicant church or denomination affirm both the lord-
ship of Christ and an official belief in the Triune God. But in the 
intervening years, the centrality of Christ to the realization of the 
salvation of the world has come to be called into question across a 
2. Unitatis redintegratio, no. 4.
Christ Our Center 
Joseph Ratzinger’s Witness1
Edward T. Oakes, S. J. 
Abstract: The author first traces the rise of today’s postmodernism 
from nineteenth- century relativism, both of which reject claims to the 
possession of an absolute and universal truth. They see such a claim as 
an imposition of one’s own limited perspective on others. This phenom-
enon rules out Christ as the center of history. He then notes that for 
him ecumenism is not just for unity in the church but for a united claim 
to the centrality and lordship of Christ over the universe. He pursues 
this line of thought through the Christology of Cardinal Ratzinger be-
fore he became Pope Benedict XVI. He explores Ratzinger’s critique of 
Marxist- tinged theology as it pertains to pluralistic theology. Namely, 
both relativize the subjects they address. So the issue is how Christians 
of different churches can proclaim Christ as the single and universal 
savior of the human race. This is the task for ecumenical discussion. The 
goal is to reaffirm together the creedal statement that the Logos that 
1. Books and Culture first published a version of this article in their September/Octo-
ber 2013 issue. 
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the matter most acutely in regard to the New Testament was the 
late- nineteenth- century theologian Ernst Troeltsch. In a shrewd 
remark, he once compared Christocentrism in theology to geo-
centrism in astronomy:
[Historical contingency] also seems to make this conclusion 
impossible—calling the Christian community the eternal 
absolute center of salvation for the whole span of human-
ity. . . . Man’s age upon earth amounts to several hundred 
thousand years or more. His future may come to still more. 
It is hard to imagine a single point of history along this 
time—and, as it just so happens, this midpoint of our own 
religious history—as the sole center of all humanity. That 
looks far too much like the absolutizing of our own contin-
gent area of life. That would be in religion what geocentrism 
and anthropocentrism are in cosmology and metaphysics, 
respectively. The whole logic of Christocentrism places it 
with these other centrisms.3
Of course, if one asks how a radical historicist and relativist 
like Troeltsch can get the wherewithal to make such an “absolut-
ist” statement ruling out Christ as the midpoint of history from 
the outset, he has his answer to that too: he grants the point! He 
freely admits that all statements about history, including his own, 
are always probabilistic: “Of course,” he says, “nothing certain can 
be said here, but it [Christocentrism] is not probable.”4
3. Ernst Troeltsch, “The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith,” 
in Ernst Troeltsch: Writings on Theology and Religion, trans. Robert Morgan and Mi-
chael Pye (Louisville, Ky.: John Knox, 1927), 189.
4. Ibid. 
wide spectrum of liberal church bodies and by liberal Christians in 
general, including by some Catholic theologians.
Largely under the influence of something called postmodern-
ism, itself largely the result of the massive influence of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, claims to the possession of a universal truth have now 
come to be seen as a hegemonic imposition of one’s particular 
and entirely limited perspective on cultures and worldviews that 
do not share that view of the truth. Accordingly, any universal 
claim to the “truth”—whether it be scientific, philosophical, or 
religious truth—is almost automatically met with skepticism, and 
even derision.
Although attacks on the Christocentrism of the New Testa-
ment became a force to be reckoned with only after Vatican II 
(at least in the Catholic Church), the roots of the problem well 
antedate Nietzsche and can even be plausibly located with the 
victory of the Copernican worldview in the seventeenth century. 
Even though Nicholas Copernicus himself certainly held to the 
centrality of the solar system in the circumscribed world of his 
own frankly medieval universe, the eventual overthrow of geocen-
trism led to what astronomers now call the Copernican Principle, 
which might be colloquially described in these words: “We’re not 
that special, so get over it.” Thus, even the whole question of ex-
traterrestrial intelligence on other planets within our galaxy (not 
to mention in the billions of other galaxies, which are probably 
forever beyond our ken) inevitably raises Christological questions.
The nineteenth century brought a whole new challenge, first 
from history and then from the other social sciences, especially 
ethnography and comparative religion. The eighteenth- century 
rationalist Benedict Spinoza had already adumbrated the problem 
in regard to the Hebrew Bible; but perhaps the person who put 
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In an important address to the heads of doctrinal commissions 
for the various bishops’s conferences in Latin America in 1996, the 
future pope pointed out that the greatest challenge for the Cath-
olic Church in the immediate postconciliar years was the claim 
of liberation theology to represent an authentic translation of the 
gospel message. Although the Bavarian cardinal was not entirely 
critical of liberation theology, he certainly saw a problem in those 
versions of it that uncritically drew on Marxism, which suddenly 
faced a crisis when the communist polities of Eastern Europe fell 
in 1989:
The fall of the European governmental systems based on 
Marxism turned out to be a kind of twilight of the gods 
for that theology of redeeming political praxis. Precisely in 
those places where the Marxist liberating ideology had been 
applied consistently, a radical lack of freedom had been 
produced, the horror of which now appeared out in the open 
before the eyes of world public opinion. The fact is that 
when politics are used to bring redemption, they promise 
too much. When they presume to do God’s work, they 
become not divine but diabolical.6
6. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today; 
Address to the Presidents of the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops’ Conferences 
of Latin America, Delivered in Guadalajara, Mexico, May 1996,” in The Essential 
Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and Speeches, edited by John F. Thornton and 
Susan B. Varenne (New York: HarperOne, 2007), 228: cited henceforth as Ratzinger, 
“Relativism.” A revised version of this talk was also published as “The New Questions 
that Arose in the Nineties: The Position of Faith and Theology Today,” in Truth and 
Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, trans. 
Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004); cited henceforth as Ratzinger, 
Tolerance. I shall throughout be quoting from the original address.
Such is our situation and constitutes the central reason I con-
sider the Catholic- Evangelical dialogue so important: not just for 
the central ecumenical reason that Christ wills unity for his Church 
but also because only here can Christians address Troeltsch’s di-
lemma without first abandoning the very Christocentrism that is 
at issue. In other words, I am convinced that this problem can only 
be solved if Christians first hold to the centrality and lordship of 
Christ over the universe and then address Troeltsch’s challenge in 
terms of Christocentrism.
In the rest of what follows, I want to outline the witness of 
Joseph Ratzinger, not only because he has thought so long and 
hard about this but also because I am convinced that his efforts 
to fashion a Christocentric Christology will prove to be one of his 
lasting contributions.5 As every physician knows, a hopeful prog-
nosis depends on an accurate diagnosis. So how does Joseph Ratz-
inger diagnose this now burning issue in the church?
First, like any good physician, he must determine how far rela-
tivism has extended its ideology into the body of the church and 
to what extent it poses a danger. Perhaps this might surprise the 
untutored, but Ratzinger does not condemn all forms of relativ-
ism tout court. Like bacteria in the body, which is both essential 
to metabolism in some forms and dangerous in others, there is a 
salubrious kind of relativism and a toxic form. For just as bacteria 
are necessary for digestion, so too certain forms of relativism can 
serve as an antidote to absolutism, an acid that eats away at dan-
gerous versions of absolutist dictatorships.
5. I shall be calling him throughout “Joseph Ratzinger,” not just because he is no 
longer pope but also because I shall be quoting throughout works written by him 
before his election to the papacy.
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the same time, there are just things that can never be unjust.”8 So, 
the question becomes, as he says, “setting limits” to relativism.
The first place where relativism must be kept at bay for the 
cardinal—and it is crucial that this is the first item on his list—is 
in Christology.9 For him any type of relativism in Christology will 
inevitably lead to its attenuation. I presume we are all familiar with 
the passage early in his book Introduction to Christianity where 
he compares the situation in theology to the folk tale told by the 
Brothers Grimm about “lucky Hans” who traded a lump of gold 
he stumbled upon for, in turn, a horse, a cow, a goose, and finally a 
whetstone, which he then threw away as a valueless encumbrance. 
Such is the consequence of relativism in Christology, he says:
The worried Christian of today is often bothered by ques-
tions like these: has our theology in the last few years not 
taken in many ways a similar path? Has it not gradually 
watered down the demands of faith, which had been 
found all too demanding, always only so little that nothing 
important seemed to be lost, yet always so much that it was 
soon possible to venture on to the next step? And will poor 
Hans, the Christian who trustfully let himself be led from 
exchange to exchange, from interpretation to interpretation, 
not really soon hold in his hand, instead of the gold with 
8. Ibid.
9. It is the thesis of Emery de Gaál, in The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) that Pope Benedict has sought to resolve all theological 
disputes, in both the pre- and post- conciliar church, from the nature- grace relation-
ship and the nature of the liturgy to the challenge of historical criticism and relativism 
in Christological terms.
Having recovered from—or at least having come to realize—
the damage caused by the communist illusion, public opinion and 
political thought reacted by shying away from claims to absolut-
ism, a shift that Cardinal Ratzinger applauds, at least provisionally:
In turn, relativism appears to be the philosophical founda-
tion of democracy. Democracy, in fact, is supposedly built 
on the basis that no one can presume to know the true way, 
and it is enriched by the fact that all roads are mutually 
recognized as fragments of the effort toward that which 
is better. . . . A system of freedom ought to be essentially 
a system of positions that are connected with one another 
because they are relative, as well as being dependent on 
historical situations open to new developments. Therefore, 
a liberal society would be a relativist society: only with that 
condition could it continue to be free and open to the future. 
In the area of politics, this concept is considerably right. There 
is no one correct political opinion. What is relative—the 
building up of liberally ordained coexistence between 
people—cannot be absolute. Thinking in this way was pre-
cisely the error of Marxism and the political theologies.7
Thus, there can be a legitimate pluralism on the mediate question 
of politics. But that concession to a legitimate relativism can hardly 
be the last word. Politics is, after all, concerned with justice. There 
might be a legitimate pluralism in mediate questions, but ultimate 
questions are not so easily relativized: “There are injustices,” says 
Ratzinger, “that will never turn into something just . . . while, at 
7. Ratzinger, “Relativism,” 229; emphasis added.
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of the medieval disputation. I am reminded in this context of an 
observation from Josef Pieper:
Thomas succeeds not only in presenting the opponent’s 
divergent or flatly opposed opinion, together with the 
underlying line of reasoning, but also, many times, in pre-
senting it better, more clearly, and more convincingly than 
the opponent himself might be able to do. In this procedure 
there emerges an element profoundly characteristic of 
St. Thomas’s intellectual style: the spirit of the disputatio, 
of disciplined opposition; the spirit of genuine discussion 
which remains a dialogue even while it is a dispute.12
But nowadays the call to dialogue in the relativist creed oper-
ates in a different ecology and has become an ultimate value. Both 
Plato and the medievals assumed without further ado that dia-
logue always aimed at the truth. Indeed Thomas could be so fair to 
his opponent and so serene in presenting opposing views precisely 
because he was so confident that dialogue was but the initiating 
moment leading to the terminating goal of truth. But once the 
relativist gives up the notion of truth as an ideal and sees it only 
as the hegemonic imposition of an opponent’s will to power, then 
dialogue becomes an end in itself.
Note again the irony of the hidden absolutism lurking here in 
the insistence that dialogue is the ultimate value before which all 
other claims must be sacrificed. But leaving aside this internal self- 
contradiction of the relativists, how is someone like Troeltsch to 
12. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 77–78.
which he began, only a whetstone, which he can be confi-
dently recommended to throw away?10
Ratzinger shrewdly notes that, despite their formal differences, 
the loud cries for a relativistic Christology now occupy the same 
ideological space once taken by liberation theologians—and some 
of the latter have moved seamlessly into becoming advocates of 
the former. This swift segue from a Marxist- tinged theology to 
a relativizing one is, to be sure, not without its ironies, since one 
of the objections raised against Christocentrism by the pluralists 
is that it leads to fanaticism and particularism—themselves the 
besetting sins of communists. Still, the relativizers are not without 
their absolutes (no surprise there, since everyone is an absolutist 
about something), and never more so than in their command to dis-
solve absolutist claims on behalf of Christ:
The relativist dissolution of Christology, and even more of 
ecclesiology, thus becomes a central commandment of reli-
gion. To return to Hick’s thinking, faith in the divinity of 
one concrete person, as he tells us, leads to fanaticism and 
particularism, to the dissociation between faith and love, 
and it is precisely this which must be overcome.11
This same contradiction lurks in their call to “dialogue.” Of 
course dialogue is an important value in relation to the plurality 
of religions and has long had, moreover, an honored place in both 
philosophy and theology, as we know from Plato and from the art 
10. Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2004/1968), 31; cited hereafter as “Ratzinger, Introduction.” 
11. Ratzinger, Relativism, 231; emphasis added.
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philosophy as a foundation of the faith independent from 
the faith.14
While Ratzinger is by no means a Barthian across the board, 
he does insist with Barth that Christology must establish its own 
norms for rationality; for taken in terms of worldly logic, the 
doctrine of Christ will always be couched in the logic of para-
dox. This is because reason is both a universal endowment in that 
being Aristotle defines precisely as a rational animal and is also 
the human faculty that gives access to the inherent rationality of a 
structured universe.15 But Christianity proclaims something revo-
lutionary about that universal Logos, that it is entirely incarnate in 
but one man, Jesus Christ: “For in him the fullness of the godhead 
was pleased to dwell” (Col. 1:19), the acceptance of which claim 
leads to the overthrow of worldly logic:
It is only in the second section of the Creed that we come 
up against the real difficulty . . . about Christianity: the pro-
fession of faith that the man Jesus, an individual executed in 
Palestine about the year 30, the Christus (anointed, chosen) 
of God, indeed God’s own Son, is the central and decisive 
point of all human history. It seems both presumptuous 
and foolish to assert that one single figure who is bound to 
disappear farther and farther into the mists of the past is 
14. Ibid., 231; emphasis added.
15. Isaac Newton’s law of gravity is of course, mathematically, a ratio—not acciden-
tally also the Latin word for reason. No wonder, then, that later historians retro-
spectively call Newton’s century the “Age of Reason,” even though that century also 
witnessed the Thirty Years’ War and such outbreaks of irrationality as the persecution 
of alleged “witches.”
be answered, who freely admitted that his critique of an absolutist 
Christocentrism was merely probable? How do we answer Rous-
seau’s observation that religion is geographically specific, tied to 
specific cultures not easily transferable to other cultures that oper-
ate under different presuppositions? How can the genuine value 
of dialogue be preserved while also maintaining the church’s con-
sistently held view that Christ is the single and universal savior of 
the human race?
Here again, we find a move by the future pope that might 
surprise both his admirers and his critics. For he rejects the En-
lightenment claim that reason can serve as the Great Adjudica-
tor. Indeed, he seems to agree with the postmodernists in at least 
this point (which they hammer away at consistently): that reason 
is always historically situated. “For human reason is not autono-
mous in the absolute,” says the cardinal: “It is always found in a 
historical context. The historical context disfigures its vision. . . . 
Therefore, it also needs historical assistance to help it cross over its 
historical barriers.”13
Remarkably, Ratzinger also concedes that this Enlightenment 
claim for the absolute validity of universal reason was the beset-
ting error of neo- scholasticism. In a passage that shows he was no 
unthinking revanchist, the future pope openly asserts:
I am of the opinion that the neo- Scholastic rationalism 
failed because—with reason totally independent from 
faith—it tried to reconstruct the praeambula fidei with pure 
rational certainty. All attempts that presume to do the same 
will have the same result. Yes, Karl Barth was right to reject 
13. Ratzinger, Relativism, 239.
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Nonetheless, and even with that point conceded, a union of faith 
and history is for him ultimately based on the union of word and 
flesh, which of course is much harder for the human intellect to 
grasp and then to accept.
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the authoritative center of all history. Although faith in the 
logos, the meaningfulness of being, corresponds perfectly 
with a tendency in the human reason, this second article 
of the Creed proclaims the absolutely staggering alliance 
of logos and sarx, of meaning and a single historical figure. 
The meaning that sustains all being has become flesh; that is, it 
has entered history and become one individual in it; it is no 
longer simply what encompasses and sustains history but is 
a point in it.16
To accept this claim entails an important methodological 
consideration, one that must overthrow the usual philosophical 
approach to reality, which seeks out universal patterns, whereas 
Christianity absolutizes one moment in history:
Accordingly the meaning of all being is first of all no longer 
to be found in the sweep of mind that rises above the indi-
vidual, the limited, into the universal; it is no longer simply 
given in the world of ideas, which transcends the individual 
and is reflected in it only in a fragmentary fashion; it is to be 
found in the midst of time, in the countenance of one man.17
These assertions by no means make Ratzinger a fideist, still less 
an irrationalist. Indeed, in his commentary on the first section of 
the creed (“I believe in God”), Ratzinger stressed a key motif that 
runs through all his writings: the harmony between faith and rea-
son, between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers. 
16. Ratzinger, Introduction, p. 193; Latin and Greek terms italicized by Ratzinger (or 
at least the translator); other emphases added.
17. Ibid., 193–94.
